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1. Introduction 
 
This study focuses on a sample of 592 small companies in the UK, which includes 419 
companies that are likely to be categorized as micro-companies under the European 
Commission’s proposed Directive on accounting for ‘micro-entities’ (EC 2007, 2011). The 
sample represents a subset of private companies that took part in a survey commissioned by 
the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
1
 (Collis 2008). The 
purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature by investigating the determinants of two 
voluntary behaviours in micro and non-micro small private companies: non-statutory audit 
and the filing of voluntary full accounts. The research examines the reasons for the auditing 
and filing decisions made in connection with the companies’ financial statements for 
accounting periods ending in 2006 in the context of the UK raising the size thresholds for a 
small company to the EU maxima in 2004. It also explores the potential impact of the  
proposed Directive on accounting for ‘micro-entities’, which is intended to reduce accounting 
and financial reporting obligations for approximately 5.3 million companies, representing 
some 75% of entities within scope of the Fourth Company Law Directive (EC 2008a). It has 
the potential to affect some 60% of registered companies in the UK (BIS/FRC 2011). 
 
The Fourth Directive requires limited liability entities to prepare and register annual 
accounts, which must be audited by one or more persons entitled to carry out such audits. The 
rationale for the requirement to make the accounts available at a registry is that anyone 
dealing with a limited liability company should be able to see the financial statements. 
Member States are permitted to provide options for qualifying small or medium-sized entities 
to register less detailed abbreviated accounts
2
 in place of the full statutory accounts, and for 
qualifying small entities to forgo the statutory audit. These concessions stem from 
recognition of the increasingly important role played in the economy by small and medium-
sized entities, which have been dubbed the backbone of Europe’s economy (EC 2008b). For 
example, UK statistics relating to the start of 2010 show that 97% of the 1.2 million active 
companies
3
 (including subsidiaries) were small (0-49 employees) and accounted for 31% of 
jobs and 29% of turnover in the private sector (BIS 2011, Table 3). 
 
The Fourth Directive specifies the maximum thresholds that Member States can set for small 
entities to qualify for audit exemption and abbreviated accounts.
4
 Entities must meet at least 
two of the three size tests shown in Table 1 relating to the maximum level of turnover, total 
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assets and average number of employees for the financial year.  The table also shows the 
proposed thresholds for the new category of micro-entity.
5
  
 
[Insert Table 1 hereabouts] 
 
Depending on the choices made by the Member State, the draft Directive on the annual 
accounts of micro-entities  proposes that a company that qualifies as a micro-entity will be 
exempt from the requirement to keep accounts on prepayments and deferred income for 
certain headings, thus limiting accounting information to key elements and permitting a 
minimum level of transparency. Member States will also be able to discharge micro-entities 
from the obligation to provide notes to the accounts (in which case the information will 
appear in the balance sheet) and calculate overheads at the year end. In addition, Member 
States will be able to exempt micro-entities from the obligation to publish annual accounts, 
provided the balance sheet information is registered by a competent authority, transmitted to 
the trade register and available on request.  
 
These regulatory relaxations for micro-entities stem from a ‘think small first’ approach, 
which rests on the assumption that the requirements are a burden to very small entities, the 
reduction of which would boost Europe’s economy (EC 2007). However, there is a paucity of 
up-to-date research on the benefits that might be lost. Moreover, previous studies focus on the 
auditing or filing options separately, whereas in the financial reporting cycle the auditing and 
filing choices coincide at the year end. A further limitation is that previous impact assessment 
studies on raising the thresholds in the UK have necessarily focused on predicted behaviour 
rather than the actual choices made. The present research addresses these gaps. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the development of 
differential reporting in the UK; Section 3 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses, 
while section 4 describes the methodology. The results are presented and discussed in section 
5 and the final section draws conclusions on the contribution and limitations of the study. 
 
2. Development of differential reporting in the UK 
Statutory corporate reporting stems from the publicity doctrine, which asserts that the 
publication of the annual report and accounts and other information is part of the price 
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companies must pay for their limited liability status (Holgate 1995). The Companies Act 
2006 incorporates EU Directives and sets the general regulatory framework, which includes 
the requirement that directors register the entity’s annual report and accounts, and distribute 
them to members. The development of company law is the responsibility of the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the official Registrar of Companies operates 
under the name of ‘Companies House’. Companies House is an executive agency of BIS and 
has responsibility for incorporating and dissolving limited companies, examining and storing 
company information delivered under the Companies Act and related legislation, and making 
that information available to the public (Companies House n.d.). 
 
The principle of differential financial reporting on the basis of size was introduced in UK 
company law when the option for small and medium-sized entities to file less detailed 
accounts, known as abbreviated accounts, was provided in the Companies Act 1981.
6
 In the 
case of small entities, this option gives relief from the requirement to file an income 
statement and a directors’ report, and merely requires the publication of an abbreviated 
balance sheet and related notes.
7
 However, full accounts must be distributed to shareholders. 
Although drawn from the full accounts, abbreviated accounts ‘do not purport to give a true 
and fair view and on commercial/confidentiality grounds they exclude financial information 
that is integral to the true and fair view’ (PwC 1999, p. 36005). In 1994 the Companies Act 
1985 was amended to permit qualifying small entities to claim exemption from the statutory 
audit. 
 
When the concessions were first introduced in the UK,
8
 the size tests were set lower than the 
EU maxima and the turnover threshold was set at a lower level for audit exemption than for 
the abbreviated accounts option. Subsequently, the thresholds were raised in steps and by 
2004 they had been standardised for all accounting and auditing options and harmonised with 
the EU maxima. In April 2008, the UK thresholds were raised once more to align them with 
the revised EU maxima. The UK was not alone in adopting the EU maxima and research 
suggests that 47% of Member States had fully implemented the filing options in the Fourth 
Directive by 2003 (EC 2005).
9
 
 
Unless it is excluded for reasons of public interest,
10
 a company in the UK will generally 
qualify as small if it meets two or more of three size criteria, shown in Table 1, in its first 
5 
 
year.
11
 In a subsequent financial year, the entity must qualify as small or satisfy the size tests 
in that year and the preceding year. The conditions for exemption from audit are that the 
entity qualifies as small in relation to that year and meets both the turnover and balance sheet 
criteria for that year.
12
 However, if audit is required by shareholders holding at least 10% of 
issued share capital, the company cannot forgo the statutory audit. 
 
Companies House statistics provide a breakdown of the proportion of active companies filing 
audit exempt accounts, full accounts and abbreviated accounts. However, the statistics do not 
distinguish between statutory and voluntary audit or between statutory and voluntary full 
accounts; nor do they indicate whether the full accounts from which the abbreviated accounts 
were derived were audited. More importantly, the percentages relate to the proportion of 
companies on the register, rather than the proportion of companies that qualify for a 
particular concession. For example subsidiaries of large groups do not qualify for exemption, 
but are apparently treated as ‘small’ in the statistics. A further problem is that official 
statistics are difficult to compare over time due to the adoption of different size thresholds for 
different elements of the financial reporting regime prior to 2004 and increases made for 
indexation purposes. 
 
The full accounts from which the abbreviated accounts are drawn may be audit exempt and 
unaudited, or they may have been audited on a voluntary basis. Under the Companies Act 
2006 c.46, s.449), the directors must file a special auditor’s report if the company files 
abbreviated accounts and is not exempt from audit or chooses voluntary audit. The special 
auditor’s report must include a statement that in the auditor’s opinion the entity is entitled to deliver 
abbreviated accounts and that the abbreviated accounts have been properly prepared in 
accordance with regulations. The auditor’s report on the company’s annual accounts need not be 
delivered. However, where the auditor’s report on the full accounts is qualified, directors filing 
abbreviated accounts must include a copy of the special auditor’s report setting out the 
qualification. Where the auditor’s report on the full accounts is unqualified but contains an 
emphasis of matter paragraph, that paragraph must be included in the special report, together 
with any further materials needed to understand it. These requirements demonstrate the link 
between audit and the filing decision. 
 
In 1999 the Company Law Review Steering Group completed a long-term review of core 
company law (DTI 1999). Given the economic importance of small and closely-held 
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businesses in the UK and further afield in Europe, the Steering Group concluded that modern 
company law should follow ‘think small first’ principles. To improve the usefulness of the 
accounts, the Group recommended that small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) ‘should no 
longer be able to file uninformative “abbreviated” accounts’ (DTI 2001, p. 3), arguing ‘it is 
important that company accounts should be generally available’ (DTI 2002, p. 2), which 
reflects the publicity doctrine mentioned  earlier. The outcome of the review was the 
Companies Act 2006, which introduced new provisions but also partly rewrote the 
Companies Acts 1985 and 1989 with a view to making the provisions for SMEs simpler and 
easier to understand. However, the abbreviated accounts option was retained. 
 
3. Literature and development of hypotheses 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A qualifying small company that chooses to register audited full accounts is making 
voluntary disclosures. As in the large company literature, these voluntary disclosures can be 
defined as ‘disclosures in excess of requirements [that] represent free choices on the part of 
company managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the 
decision needs of users of their annual reports’ (Meek et al. 1995, p. 555). Over recent 
decades considerable attention has been paid to developing theory in the context of voluntary 
disclosures by large, listed companies (for example, Firth 1979, Leftwich et al. 1981, Meek et 
al. 1995, Schleicher 1998, Holland 2005), but very little research has been carried out in 
small, private companies. However, caution must be exercised in adopting a theoretical 
framework or research methods
13
 based on a large company template. The motivations of the 
directors of large, listed companies operating in the capital markets are highly likely to differ 
from motivations of the owner-directors of small private companies (see section 3.3). 
 
In the small company literature, comparison of previous UK studies is problematic due to 
changes in accounting regulation, increases in the size thresholds and fluctuations in currency 
values. Moreover, some of the previous studies are now somewhat dated or too small to 
permit generalisation, although they provide valuable insights (for example, Page 1984, 
Keasey and Short 1990, Freedman and Goodwin 1993, Pratten 1998, Tauringana and Clarke 
2000, John and Healeas, 2000, Lin-Seouw 2001, ICAS 2002, Marriott et al. 2006). The 
usefulness of studies conducted in other jurisdictions is limited by the need to take account of 
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country-specific factors such as social, economic and cultural differences, notions about the 
objective of financial reporting, and the relative importance of principles and rules (Haller 
and Walton 2003). 
 
A questionnaire survey by Collis and Jarvis (2000) for the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW) examined the views of the directors of 385 companies filing 
full accounts with a turnover up to £4.2 million (the proposed EU maximum for a small 
company at the time of the study) and found that 63% predicted they would opt for audit if 
offered exemption.
14
 Further analysis of that data by Collis et al. (2004) identified a number 
of cost, management and agency factors that influenced demand for voluntary audit. These 
factors were tested again in a survey by Collis (2003) for the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), which examined the views of the directors of 790 small companies with a 
turnover up to £4.8 million (the proposed EU maximum for a small company at that time). 
This found that 42% of respondents predicted they would have a voluntary audit.
15
  
 
In the context of the debate over raising the thresholds for audit exemption in the UK, Collis 
(2010) examined the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate for demand for voluntary audit 
using the 2003 UK data and comparing it with data from Denmark. She found evidence in 
both countries that turnover alone is not a sufficient surrogate for the cost and benefits of 
audit, which are broadly similar in both countries. The model developed by Collis et al. 
(2004) was also tested with data from Finnish companies with fewer than 10 employees by 
Niemi et al. (2012). This provides evidence of the robustness of the model in a third 
regulatory setting. These studies suggest that despite regulatory differences (in particular, 
definitions of size), many of the drivers of demand for voluntary audit are common to the 
UK, Denmark and Finland. Although these studies contribute to the theoretical framework for 
this study, their findings suffer from the limitation that they are based on the directors’ 
predicted decisions and focus on decisions by companies registering full accounts. 
 
Little is known about the factors that determine the filing choice in SMEs. The Professional 
Oversight Board for Accountancy
16
 (POBA) reported that research it commissioned to 
examine 355 sets of accounts at Companies House in 2006 found approximately 60% were 
abbreviated, which was comparable with the findings of its questionnaire survey of 600 small 
and medium-sized companies, where just over 50% reported they had filed abbreviated 
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accounts (POBA 2006, p. 24). This suggests a significant proportion of companies register 
voluntary full accounts. However, there is little evidence of the directors’ reasons for their 
filing choice and no study has investigated any link between voluntary disclosure and 
voluntary audit. The present study investigates the following research questions: 
 
1. What factors influence the decision to opt for voluntary audit in small companies? 
2. What factors influence the decision to register voluntary full accounts in small 
companies? 
 
The following review of the literature examines the costs and benefits of voluntary audit and 
voluntary full accounts for small companies and develops the associated hypotheses. 
  
3.2 Cost 
In a broad sense the costs of audit and disclosure can be conceived as ‘cash costs’, such as 
auditors’ fees, employees’ salaries and filing fees, and ‘proprietary costs’, such as losses 
incurred from the use of information by competitors. There is likely to be a substantial fixed 
element in the cash costs of audit and disclosure so that the relative cash cost declines as 
turnover increases. Collis (2003) found that the modal saving from discontinuing audit for 
small companies with a turnover up to £1 million (the UK exemption threshold at the time of 
the study) was £1,000, which is a significant saving. Collis et al. (2004) found that small 
companies with a larger turnover were more likely to choose voluntary audit. Total assets and 
number of employees were also tested, but were not found to add significant information. The 
authors concluded that these two size tests could be excluded as criteria for audit exemption. 
However, the study also demonstrated that size alone does not capture all the costs and 
benefits of audit in small companies. 
 
In 1995 the estimated additional cost of preparing abbreviated accounts was £100-£250 (DTI 
1995, p. 12) and the DTI gave this as the main reason why more companies had not taken up 
the option. This view was shared by the ICAEW (1995, p. 4): ‘We believe that many small 
companies do not bother to convert the accounts they have to send to shareholders into 
abbreviated accounts because there is an attendant expense’. Subsequent case study evidence 
(Marriott et al. 2006) suggested a typical fee of around £100, but it was found that some 
accountants made no charge because of the ease with which accountancy software allowed 
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them to generate abbreviated accounts from the full accounts prepared for shareholders. 
Given the widespread use of accountancy software, this suggests the cost of the filing 
decision may now be small. 
 
The focus on relieving the disproportionate burden placed on small companies and the 
decision to raise the UK size thresholds to the EU maxima in 2004 suggest that turnover 
captures the cost of audit, but some studies have used it as a surrogate for separation of 
ownership and control (Chow 1982, Tauringana and Clarke 2000) or to measure the value of 
wealth at risk if the financial statements were not audited (Abdel-Khalik 1993). In this study, 
relative cash cost is assessed in two ways. The first is that turnover is used as a proxy for 
inverse relative cash cost. As explained above, because of the economies of scale, turnover is 
inversely related to the relative cash cost of audit. The second is that respondents were asked 
directly about the extent of the ‘cost burden’ of their audit and filing decisions. 
 
This literature leads to the following cost hypotheses: 
 
H1 Voluntary audit is positively associated with turnover. 
H2 Voluntary audit is negatively associated with the perceived cost burden. 
H3 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with turnover. 
H4 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with the perceived cost burden (due 
to the additional cost of producing abbreviated accounts). 
 
3.3 Management factors 
In 1995, some 14 years after the abbreviated accounts option was introduced in the UK, there 
was some concern that the estimated take-up was only 35% of eligible companies (DTI 1995, 
p. 12). However, 10 years later it had risen to an estimated 43% (DTI 2005, p. 31). The basis 
of these estimates is not known, given the absence of a sampling frame of eligible companies. 
The evidence provided by POBA (2006, p. 24) that suggests some 50% of small and 
medium-sized companies filed abbreviated accounts in 2006 does not tell us what proportion 
of the other 50% had volunteered full accounts or were under a statutory obligation to file full 
accounts. 
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Research in the 1980s (Page 1981, 1984) contended that the directors of small companies had 
little knowledge of accounting. Over the years this may have changed, since Collis and Jarvis 
(2000) found that the principal directors of 67% of small companies in their sample had 
trained in, or studied, business or management subjects. Nevertheless, if an entity is close to 
the size thresholds, the question of whether it qualifies for the small company options must be 
reviewed regularly and this may lead to the directors seeking professional guidance. 
 
Accountants are the main source of advice to small firms in the UK (Bennett and Robson 
1999 and 2003, Gooderham 2004, POBA 2006, Dyer and Ross 2007) and play a key role in 
advising on regulation (Blackburn et al. 2006). Traditionally, the financial reporting function 
is outsourced and the majority of smaller companies rely on an external accountant to prepare 
the statutory accounts (Page 1981, Carsberg et al. 1985, Collis and Jarvis 2000, Collis 2003, 
2008). Directors faced with the choice for the first time are likely to benefit from the 
accountant’s experiences with similar companies and an accountant retained for some years is 
likely to have considerable knowledge of the business and the directors’ future plans, and be 
in a strong position to discuss the costs and benefits of the filing options. Under the model of 
economic rationality proposed by Weber (1968), a cost and benefit analysis represents formal 
rationality. Recent evidence (Kitching et al. 2011) shows that considerable importance is 
attached to the accountant’s analysis of the costs and benefits: 64% of accountants with small 
company clients advised them to file abbreviated accounts if they (the accountants) 
considered it appropriate, compared with 26% of accountants who informed clients of the 
advantages and disadvantages and let the directors decide. The research found that 
accountants who advised clients to file abbreviated accounts were more likely to report that 
all their clients filed abbreviated accounts, and this suggests that the accountant’s advice is 
generally followed. The fact that some accountants discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
with the directors of small companies suggests that a periodic review of the costs and benefits 
takes place. 
 
The above discussion leads to the following management hypotheses: 
 
H5 Voluntary audit is positively associated with taking the accountant’s advice. 
H6 Voluntary audit is positively associated with reviewing the costs and benefits. 
H7 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with taking the accountant’s advice. 
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H8 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with reviewing the costs and 
benefits. 
 
Collis et al. (2004) found that voluntary audit is associated with companies whose directors 
believed that audit improves the quality of the financial information and provides a check on 
internal books and records. Most small companies are closely held family-owned businesses 
(Bolton 1971, Poutziouris et al. 1998, Collis and Jarvis 2000, Collis 2003, 2008). Therefore, 
opportunistic behaviour by management, at the expense of shareholders, may be less of a 
problem than it is in larger companies where there is separation of ownership and control. 
Collis et al. (2004) identified the management benefits from an independent audit as the 
check on internal controls and the improvement in the quality of the financial information, 
which reduces information risk. In small companies, inherent risk and internal control risk are 
high (Collis et al. 2004). Consequently, there is a strong likelihood of material misstatements 
arising in the financial statements and a strong likelihood that such misstatements will not be 
detected in a timely fashion by internal controls. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
suggests a reduction in control risk and inherent risk would lower agency costs (Hossain et al. 
1995, Watson et al. 2002, Prencipe 2004) and lead to an economically rational decision 
(Collis 2010). This discussion leads to the following management hypotheses: 
 
H9   Voluntary audit is positively associated with agreement that it acts as a check on the 
accounting systems and records. 
H10 Voluntary audit is positively associated with agreement that it improves the quality 
of financial information. 
 
Interviews with small companies, soon after the abbreviated accounts option was introduced 
in the UK, found that in general directors ‘did not see the disclosure of commercial 
information (for example, turnover and stock [inventory]) about a company as a burden, in 
that it gave significant help to competitors’ (Carsberg et al. 1985, p. 6). Ten years later, the 
directors still did not see ‘a significant disadvantage in making publicly available more 
information than they strictly need’ (ICAEW 1995, p. 4). However, abbreviated accounts 
may offer benefits if there is ‘a competitive or other advantage to be gained by not disclosing 
particular information’ (DTI 1995, p. 12). A study of medium-sized companies in the 
manufacturing sector found companies with intrinsic advantages (the ability to earn long-
12 
 
term above average profits through features of the business) are less likely to file abbreviated 
accounts. In that study, age was used as a proxy ‘since companies survive longer when they 
have greater intrinsic advantages’ (Dedman and Lennox 2009, p. 224). Unless it occupied a 
niche market, this could also apply to a small company trying to protect its position in the 
industry by withholding information from rivals. The following management hypotheses test 
these propositions:  
 
H11 Voluntary full accounts are negatively associated with the perceived disclosure 
burden. 
H12 Voluntary full accounts are negatively associated with the age of the company. 
 
A survey of credit analysts and credit managers (Morris and Omrod 1990) found that when 
full accounts were filed by small companies, they were the most important source of 
information for assessing credit risk. When abbreviated accounts were filed, approximately 
half the information omitted could be found from alternative sources, but the cost of doing so 
was high. Interview data from banks, commercial credit reference agencies and credit 
insurance companies (Kitching et al. 2011) confirms that abbreviated accounts offer limited 
insights into the financial performance and position of a company, and that other information 
is needed to assess credit risk. It is likely that the directors of small companies are aware of 
this because some file voluntary full accounts that have been audited on a non-mandatory 
basis to improve their credit rating (Collis 2003, Marriott et al. 2006).
17
 These propositions 
are tested by the following management hypotheses: 
 
H13 Voluntary audit is positively associated with agreement that it has a positive effect 
on the credit rating score. 
H14 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with voluntary audit. 
 
3.4 Agency factors 
Collis (2003) used turnover as a proxy for the inverse relative cash cost of audit and to 
capture whether the company is large enough to have external shareholders and/or external 
lenders. She argues that these factors are better explained by the theory that the directors will 
be willing to bear the cost of audit due to the beneficial role the audited accounts play in 
supporting agency relationships (Jensen and Meckling 1976) with principals who are distant 
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from the actions of management. Power (1997) contends that, in small companies, principals 
include external shareholders, lenders and creditors who cannot verify the information. Since 
such agency relationships are unlikely to be transient, it is probable that, when thresholds are 
raised, companies with agency relationships will continue to file full audited accounts on a 
voluntary basis to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry. This will represent 
consistency in terms of financial reporting policies rather than force of habit. 
 
Existing and potential investors are considered to be one of the main groups of users of the 
published accounts (ASB 1999, IFRS 2010). Investors in large companies are external 
shareholders who delegate authority for managing the business to the directors, which leads 
to information asymmetry. However, investors in many small private companies are owner-
directors (Page 1984, Carsberg et al. 1985, Collis 2003, 2008). Nevertheless, ‘even in the 
very smallest company disputes can arise between shareholders and the audited accounts can 
be an essential protection’ (Freedman and Goodwin 1993, p. 128). Moreover, information 
asymmetry can be present among owner-directors if they lack the skills necessary to interpret 
the financial information (Power 1997). These views are supported by evidence of demand 
for audit in small companies that are not wholly family-owned (Collis 2003, Collis et al. 
2004) and in small companies that have one or more shareholder who is not involved in the 
day-to-day management of the business (Collis 2003). The study of very small companies in 
Finland (Niemi et al. 2012) found that outsourcing critical accounting functions creates a 
need to control for information asymmetry between the company and the external accountant, 
which increases the likelihood of independent audit. On the other hand, if the external 
accountant provides tax advice, demand for voluntary audit is likely to decrease. 
  
Banks are the main source of external finance for small firms (Cosh and Hughes 2003) and 
recent research (Cosh et al. 2009) shows that overdrafts and credit cards are the most 
commonly used forms of finance. The audited accounts play an important role in the lending 
decision (Berry et al. 1987, Berry and Waring 1995, Berry et al. 1993, Deakins and Hussain 
1994, ACCA 1998). However, lenders have the economic power to demand special purpose 
financial statements and banks can monitor cash flows in order to assess lending risk. Berry 
et al. (1987) suggest that bankers consider that the full statutory financial statements to be the 
most important source of documentary information because they are more reliable than the 
management accounts, but information about the person, the business and the lending 
14 
 
proposition are also key factors (Berry et al. 2003). A global survey of 559 bankers 
(IFAC/The Banker 2009) shows that lenders increasingly look at cash flow information, 
collateral and customer history in addition to the financial statements, key risk indicators and 
industry trends. Other evidence (Collis 2003, 2010, Collis et al. 2004, Collis and Jarvis 2002) 
indicates that small companies file voluntary audited full accounts to maintain relationships 
with the bank and to send positive signals to lenders, suppliers and customers that the 
business is well managed (Marriott et al. 2006). A UK study of 5,139 small companies filing 
full accounts (Lennox and Pittman 2011) provides evidence that low-risk companies attract 
upgrades to their credit rating when they signal their favourable borrowing characteristics by 
choosing voluntary audit. 
  
Prior research suggests that small companies tend to follow lifestyle or satisficing strategies 
because survival and stability are often more important than growth and profit-maximisation. 
The latter (growth and profit-maximisation) are the main strategies pursued by large 
companies (Jarvis et al. 1996). Nevertheless, a survey of SMEs during the current economic 
crisis (Cosh et al. 2009) shows that 59% intended to grow over the next three years. 
According to Olsson (1980), filing full audited accounts would be advisable if the 
shareholders were intending to sell the business, plan a flotation or seek another form of 
external investment, although Collis (2003) found only 1% of small companies were planning 
a listing in the foreseeable future.  
 
This literature leads to the following agency hypotheses: 
 
H15 Voluntary audit is negatively associated with the company being wholly family 
owned. 
H16 Voluntary audit is positively associated with the company having shareholders who 
are not involved in the day-to-day management. 
H17 Voluntary audit is positively associated with perceived demand from existing 
investors. 
H18 Voluntary audit is positively associated with perceived demand from lenders. 
H19 Voluntary audit is positively associated with perceived demand from suppliers or 
customers. 
H20 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with perceived usefulness to users. 
15 
 
H21 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with perceived use by potential 
investors. 
H22 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with perceived use by lenders. 
H23 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with perceived use by suppliers or 
customers. 
H24 Voluntary full accounts are positively associated with perceived use by credit rating 
agencies. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Sample selection and data collection 
This study focuses on 592 small private companies. These represent a subset of 1,294 small 
and medium-sized companies that responded to a postal questionnaire survey in September 
2007, which had been commissioned by BERR as part of a regulatory impact assessment 
(Collis 2008). The questions were guided by case study research (Marriott et al. 2006) and 
the draft proposals for regulatory reform in the EU (EC 2007). The questionnaire was 
developed jointly with BERR, discussed with experts in the accountancy profession and 
piloted with a convenience sample of directors of six small private companies. It was then 
sent to 9,458 private companies in the UK which had been selected from the Fame database
18
 
if they had filed their accounts for 2006 by 31 August 2007 and met the following size 
criteria:
19
 
 
 total assets not exceeding £12.9 million 
 an average of no more than 250 employees during the financial year. 
 
Companies with activities in all sectors were included, apart from Section J Financial 
Intermediation (SIC 66, 67 and 68).
20
 Only independent companies were included, since 
subsidiaries may be part of larger, non-exempt groups. Table 2 summarises the selection 
criteria and search results. 
 
[Insert Table 2 hereabouts] 
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The sample comprises small companies on Fame that were not in the financial intermediation 
sector, and had a year-end before 31 October 2006 or had filed early.
21
 As a non-financial 
measure of size, number of employees offers the advantage of being more stable than 
turnover (the latter being more vulnerable to economic conditions and inflation), but the 
number of employees is only disclosed in the notes if the company files full accounts. It is not 
known how Fame gathered or estimated the number of employees for those filing abbreviated 
accounts. If the disclosure was voluntary, there may be bias towards companies that are 
inclined to adopt other types of voluntary behaviour. 
 
Responses need to be evaluated in the light of such biases, many of which result from the 
lack of a complete and up-to-date sampling frame, and conflicting data about the number of 
small independent companies.
22
 Fame contains information drawn from the annual reports 
and accounts registered at Companies House in the UK and the Companies Registration 
Office in Ireland. According to the publisher (Bureau van Dijk 2011), Fame aids financial 
analysis by presenting the accounts in a standard format and contains information on 7 
million companies in the UK and Ireland, which include: 
 
 2 million companies in a detailed format 
 a further 200,000 companies in a summary format 
 details of 700,000 companies that are active but are not required to file accounts, or 
which have yet to file their accounts 
 4 million companies that are no longer active, but which are included to aid research 
into patterns in default and to confirm previous existence.
23
 
 
Table 2 shows that at 31 August 2007 when the companies were selected, Fame claimed to 
contain 2.6 million active companies. Fame’s publisher points out that it does not include all 
companies with a turnover under £0.5 million, but does not provide a rationale for this under-
representation. There are several potential explanations. For example, in 2007 private 
companies could register their accounts up to 10 months after the end of their accounting 
reference period,
24
 but some new companies may not have survived long enough to file 
accounts. The poor representation of very small companies in this study is a limitation that is 
difficult to remedy, but which nevertheless must be borne in mind when interpreting the 
results.  
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Comparing the population of companies on Fame with the data provided by Companies 
House (2007) and the SME statistics published by BERR (2007) is problematic due to 
differences in the periods covered, the regions and sectors included, and the type of analysis 
provided. 
 
According to Companies House (2007, Table A2), the total number of public and private 
companies incorporated in Great Britain and on the register at 31 March 2007 was 2.34 
million. Two reasons for the difference between this figure and the 2.62 million on Fame are 
that Companies House excludes companies registered in Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, and Fame does not include all companies with a turnover under £0.5 million. 
Companies House (2007, Table F2) shows the number of annual accounts that had been 
registered at 31 March 2007 was only 1.65 million. The difference between the number of 
companies and the number of accounts registered is likely to be due to new registrations
25
 
and some companies being dissolved, in liquidation or in the course of being removed from 
the register.
26
 Although Table F2 analyses the accounts filed by type, there is no breakdown 
by size of company.
27
 
 
The SME statistics published by BERR (2007, Table 3) differ from the Companies House 
statistics because the former include companies registered in Northern Ireland but exclude 
those in the Republic of Ireland. This source shows the total number of companies in the UK 
at the start of 2007 was 1.2 million. One reason for the BERR statistics being lower than the 
Companies House data is that definition of private sector used by BERR (2007) excludes the 
non-profit sector. Another reason is almost certainly due to the exclusions of entities that are 
not registered for Value Added Tax or Pay As You Earn. There are many companies that fall 
into this category, including subsidiaries, and it is not clear how subsidiaries are dealt with in 
the SME statistics. Although BERR (2007) does not provide an analysis of the type of 
accounts filed, Table 3 of the SME statistics gives a breakdown by turnover
28
 and number of 
employees. Since Companies House does not collect turnover or employee data from all 
small companies, it is likely that this analysis is based on estimates from VAT returns, PAYE 
information and other sources. POBA (2006, p. 7) reported that at least 95% of the 1.1m 
active companies that filed accounts in 2004-5 were small and it is likely that this was 
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estimated from SME statistics at the start of 2005 (SBS 2006, Table 2), where further 
analysis indicates that 95% were small in terms of number of employees (0-49).  
 
Another challenge for the small business researcher is the relatively low response rate to 
surveys since the directors may be sceptical about the relevance of academic research or 
simply too busy running the business to participate (Curran and Blackburn 2001). The 
response rate to Collis (2008) was 14% without reminders, which was lower than 17% 
achieved by Collis and Jarvis (2000) and 30% achieved by Collis (2003), both of which used 
reminders. Other differences were that the Collis (2008) survey covered a wider range of 
issues, the BERR logo was unknown and there were three postal strikes during the survey 
period. Nevertheless, the response rate of 14% was higher than other UK studies; for 
example, 12% by Poutziouris et al. (1998), 11% by the ICAEW (1996) and 13% by the 
Bolton Committee’s accounting survey in 1971.29 Response rates to recent accounting 
surveys of small companies in continental Europe have also been low; for example, 10% in 
Germany (Mages 2008, Eierle and Haller 2009) and only 6% in Belgium (Coppens and Van 
Wymeersch 2007). 
 
4.2 Companies in the analysis 
As stated, the companies analysed are a subset of 1,294 small and medium-sized private 
companies responding to a questionnaire survey conducted for BERR (Collis 2008). In 
response to a question that asked whether the company’s 2006 accounts had been audited, 
702 companies stated that they had been audited because the company was above the size 
thresholds and the remaining 592 companies stated that their accounts had been audited on a 
voluntary basis or that they were not audited because the company was exempt. From this it 
was deduced that these 592 companies qualified as small in 2006. These are the small 
companies in the analysis. There was some size bias in this sample, which tended to be 
slightly smaller (in terms of total assets) than the small companies that did not respond to the 
questionnaire. 
 
Univariate analysis of the survey responses from these 592 small companies found that 39% 
had opted for voluntary audit in 2006 and 61% had chosen exemption.
30
 In addition, 51% had 
filed voluntary full accounts in 2006 and 49% had filed abbreviated accounts. Further 
analysis suggests that 419 (71%) of the 592 small companies could be classified as micro-
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companies,
31
 of which 22% had opted for voluntary audit in 2006 while 78% had chosen 
exemption. In respect of filing, 45% had filed voluntary full accounts and 55% had filed 
abbreviated accounts. 
 
As previously stated, all 592 small companies had filed their 2006 accounts by the end of 
August 2007 and, because they were surveyed in September 2007, the respondents were 
recalling recent events. In 91% of cases the respondent was the director or company 
secretary. Both these factors increase the validity of the responses. Their answers regarding 
their financial reporting choices corresponded with the Companies House data on Fame and 
were consistent with their responses to related questions. Key characteristics of the small 
companies were as follows:   
 
 67% had either one or two shareholders 
 66% were owner-managed32 
 57% were wholly family-owned (includes companies with only one owner) 
 34% had been incorporated for up to 5 years 
 in 77% of cases an external accountant had prepared the 2006 accounts 
 70% were in favour of filing exemption for micro-companies. 
 
External sources of finance comprised: banks (33%); hire purchase and/or leasing (22%); 
factoring/invoice discounting (6%) and forward payments (6%).  Internal sources of finance 
used were: directors’ loans (37%); loans from family and friends (5%); and loans from the 
company’s pension fund (2%). 
 
The costs and benefits of voluntary audit and voluntary full accounts for small companies are 
tested in two related logistic regression models described in sections 4.3 and 4.4, which are 
based on the following general model: 
 
Financial reporting choice = f (cost, management factors, agency factors) 
 
4.3 Variables in the model of demand for voluntary audit 
Table 3 describes the variables in the analysis of demand for voluntary audit, where 
VOLAUDIT (the dependent variable) captures whether the 2006 accounts were audited on a 
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voluntary basis (coded 1) or the company chose exemption (coded 0). The source of the data 
is the survey by Collis (2008).  
 
[Insert Table 3 hereabouts] 
4.3.1 Cost 
TURNOVER (H1) is a proxy for the cost of audit and captures ordinal data relating to the 
company’s turnover in 2006, which was coded from 1 to 8 as indicated in Table 3. It is 
expected to be positively associated with voluntary audit. COSTAUDIT (H2) captures ordinal 
data from the survey and measures the extent of agreement (see Table 3) that the cost of audit 
was a major burden. It is expected to have a negative association with voluntary audit. This 
study uses a survey response to measure the directors’ perceptions of the cost burden, 
whereas Collis (2003) and Collis et al. (2004) drew the same conclusion based solely on 
turnover as a proxy for cost. 
 
4.3.2 Management factors 
ADVICE (H5) is a dummy variable (1,0) that captures whether the company received advice 
on accounting or auditing regulations from an external accountant in 2006. It is expected to 
have a positive association with voluntary audit. REVIEWAUDIT (H6) is an ordinal variable 
that captures the extent of agreement (see Table 3) that the costs and benefits of audit had 
been reviewed since 2003. It is expected to have a positive association with voluntary audit. 
CHECK (H9) QUALITY (H10) and CREDITSCORE (H13) are ordinal variables that capture 
the extent of agreement (see Table 3) that audit acts as a check on the accounting systems and 
records, improves the quality of the financial information and has a positive effect on the 
credit rating score respectively. These variables are expected to be positively associated with 
voluntary audit. 
 
4.3.3 Agency factors 
FAMILY (H15) is a dummy variable (1,0) that captures whether the company is wholly 
family owned and is expected to have a negative association with voluntary audit. 
EXOWNERS (H16) is a dummy variable (1,0) that captures whether the company has external 
investors without access to day-to-day financial information and is expected to be positively 
associated with voluntary audit. INVESTORSAUDIT (H17), LENDERSAUDIT (H18) and 
SUPPSCUSTSAUDIT (H19) capture ordinal data measuring the extent of agreement (see 
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Table 3) that shareholders, banks/lenders, and major suppliers or major customers require 
audited accounts respectively. These variables are expected to have a positive association 
with voluntary audit. 
 
4.3.4 Control variable 
CONSISTENTAUDIT is an ordinal variable that measures the extent of agreement (see Table 
3) that consistency with the audit decision in previous years was a major factor and controls 
for the effect of tradition or habit. 
 
[Insert Table 3 hereabouts] 
 
4.4 Variables in the model of demand for voluntary full accounts 
Table 4 describes the variables in the analysis of the demand for voluntary full accounts, 
where VOLFULL (the dependent variable) and captures whether the company filed voluntary 
full accounts for 2006 (coded 1) or abbreviated accounts (coded 0). Unless stated otherwise, 
the source of the data is the survey by Collis (2008).  
 
[Insert Table 4 hereabouts] 
 
4.4.1 Cost 
TURNOVER (H3) is a proxy for the cost of the filing choice and captures ordinal data relating 
to the company’s turnover in 2006, which was coded from 1 to 8 as indicated in Table 4. It is 
expected to be positively associated with voluntary full accounts. COSTFILING (H4) 
captures ordinal data on the extent of agreement that the cheapest option was a major factor 
(see Table 4) and is expected to have a positive association with voluntary full accounts. 
 
4.4.2 Management factors 
ADVICE (H7) is a dummy variable (1,0) that captures whether an external accountant gave 
advice on accounting or auditing regulations in 2006. It is expected to be positively 
associated with voluntary full accounts. REVIEWFILING (H8) captures nominal data on 
whether the directors agree they had reviewed the costs and benefits of the filing options 
since 2003 (1,0). It is also expected to have a positive association with voluntary full 
accounts. DISCLOSETOVER (H11) captures nominal data on whether the directors agree 
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disclosing turnover is or would be a major disadvantage (1,0). It is expected to have a 
negative relationship with voluntary full accounts. AGE (H12) is captures ratio data relating 
to the age of the company, which is calculated as 2006 (the reference year for the study) 
minus the year of incorporation provided by Fame. It represents the company’s intrinsic 
advantage and is expected to have a negative relationship with voluntary full accounts. 
VOLAUDIT (H14) captures nominal data on whether the 2006 accounts were audited on a 
voluntary basis (coded 1) or the company chose exemption (coded 0). It is expected to be 
positively associated with voluntary full accounts. 
 
4.4.3 Agency factors 
USEFULTOUSERS (H20) captures nominal data on whether the respondents agree that their 
accounts filed at Companies House are useful to users (1,0). It is expected to have a positive 
association with voluntary full accounts. INVESTORSFILING (H21), LENDERSFILING 
(H22), SUPPSCUSTSFILING (H23) and CREDITAGENCIES (H24) capture nominal data on 
whether the directors agree that potential investors/acquirers, bank/lenders, suppliers/trade 
creditors/customers and credit rating agencies respectively use their accounts filed at 
Companies House (1,0). These variables are expected to be positively associated with 
voluntary full accounts. 
 
4.4.4 Control variable 
CONSISTENTFILING captures nominal data on whether the directors agree that consistency 
with the filing decision in previous years was a major factor (1,0) and is used to control for 
the effect of tradition or habit. 
 
[Insert Table 4 hereabouts] 
 
The vast majority of registered companies (97%) have fewer than 50 employees and 87% 
have fewer than 10 employees (BIS 2011, Table 3). Research shows that small firms are most 
vulnerable to failure during the first five years (Milne and Thomson 1986, Storey 1994). 
However failures or removal from the register for other reasons are offset by new 
incorporations. In addition, some may have crossed the size thresholds into the medium or 
large categories. Therefore, age is positively skewed in the population. As the other 
independent variables are ordinal or nominal, non-parametric tests of association and 
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difference are used in the analysis. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable makes 
logistic regression the appropriate choice.
33
 Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the 
continuous variable in the analysis and Table 6 shows frequencies for the categorical 
variables. 
 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 hereabouts] 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
5.1 Determinants of voluntary audit 
The results of the non-parametric tests to examine differences between the two groups in 
VOLAUDIT and the ordinal and categorical variables are significant (p ≤ 0.01) for all 
variables apart from REVIEWAUDIT (H6). Therefore, the null hypothesis for 
REVIEWAUDIT cannot be rejected and this variable is excluded from the regression model. 
Spearman’s correlation was used to check for multicollinearity among the remaining 
independent variables.
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Table 7 shows the results of the logistic regression of the determinants of voluntary audit for 
all small companies in Panel A. The following interpretation focuses on the results in Panels 
B and C, which show the results when the small companies are separated into two groups: 
non-micro small companies (small companies excluding the micro-companies) and micro-
companies respectively. 
 
Looking first at the cost factors, the results for TURNOVER (H1) are highly significant in 
both size groups (p ≤ 0.01), indicating that demand for audit increases with revenue 
irrespective of size. COSTAUDIT (H2) is also highly significant for both size groups (p ≤ 
0.01) and the correlation coefficients carry the expected negative sign, confirming that 
companies choosing voluntary audit do not consider cost is a major burden. This suggests 
that the cost of audit is outweighed by the benefits. The benefits include both management 
and agency factors. 
 
Among the management factors, the results for ADVICE (H5) are not significant for non-
micro small companies (p > 0.10), but are highly significant for micro-companies (p ≤ 0.01). 
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Thus, micro-companies receiving advice on accounting and auditing regulations from their 
external accountant are likely to opt for voluntary audit. This extends previous research that 
highlights the key role played by accountants in advising on regulation in general (Blackburn 
et al. 2006) and on accounting and assurance in particular (Collis 2003 and Collis et al. 
2004). In the context of the UK raising the turnover threshold for audit exemption from £1 
million to £5.6 million in 2004, the significant results for ADVICE suggest that the audit 
policies pursued by very small companies in 2006 were based on informed decisions. 
CHECK (H9) is significant at the 10% level (p ≤ 0.10) for micro-companies only, giving 
support to the notion that audit is considered a beneficial a check on accounting systems and 
records in these very small companies. There is no evidence to reject the null hypotheses for 
QUALITY (H10) and CREDITSCORE (H13) (p > 0.10). The results in respect of the latter are 
surprising since Lennox and Pittman (2011) find evidence that small companies improve their 
credit ratings via the positive signal sent by continuing to have an audit when no longer 
legally required to do so. However, the present study measures the directors’ perceptions of 
the effect on the company’s credit rating, while Lennox and Pittman measured the actual 
effect. A limitation of the Lennox and Pittman study is that it focused solely on companies 
filing full accounts, whereas the present study investigates companies filing either full or 
abbreviated accounts. 
 
An examination of the agency factors shows there is no evidence to reject the null hypotheses 
in respect of FAMILY (H15) (p > 0.10), and although the results for EXOWNERS (H16) are 
significant for non-micro small companies, the correlation coefficient shows an unexpected 
negative sign. Therefore, the null hypothesis for H16 cannot be rejected. The results for 
INVESTORSAUDIT (H17) are highly significant across the size range (p ≤ 0.01), signifying 
demand for assurance from present investors, who could be minority shareholders exercising 
their statutory rights. LENDERSAUDIT (H18) captures directors’ perceptions that the 
bank/lenders require audited accounts and the results are significant for micro-companies at 
the 10% level. Micro-companies are likely to have fewer assets and/or a shorter track record 
with which to demonstrate the success of the business model than non-micro small 
companies and audited accounts may mitigate the risk to banks providing overdrafts and 
other forms of debt finance in these very small companies. The correlation coefficients in 
respect of SUPPSCUSTSAUDIT (H19) carry an unexpected negative sign. Therefore, the 
perception that major customers or suppliers require audited accounts is not one of the factors 
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driving the demand for voluntary audit in such companies. CONSISTENTAUDIT controls for 
tradition or habit and is significant for micro-companies (p ≤ 0.01). 
 
The Wald statistics in Panel B of Table 7 indicate that the most powerful predictor of 
voluntary audit in non-micro small companies is TURNOVER (H1), followed by 
INVESTORSAUDIT (H17) and COSTAUDIT (H2). The pseudo R
2
 indicates that the model 
explains 78% of the variance. The Wald statistics in Panel C of Table 7 indicate that the most 
powerful predictor of voluntary audit in micro-companies is ADVICE (H5) followed by 
COSTAUDIT (H2), INVESTORSAUDIT (H17) TURNOVER (H1), LENDERSAUDIT (H18) 
and CHECK (H9). The pseudo R
2
 shows the model explains 52% of the variance. The pseudo 
R
2
 for all small companies (Panel A of Table 7) is 73%. This is superior to the models of 
Collis (2003) and Collis et al. (2004), which only explained 39% and 35% of the variance 
respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 7 hereabouts] 
 
5.2 Determinants of voluntary full accounts 
The results of non-parametric tests to examine differences between the two groups in 
VOLFILING and the ordinal and categorical variables were significant (p ≤ 0.05) for all 
variables. Spearman’s correlation was used to check for multicollinearity among the 
independent variables.
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Table 8, panel A, shows the results of the logistic regression of the determinants of voluntary 
full accounts for all small companies. Panels B and C show the results for the non-micro 
small companies (small companies excluding the micro-companies) separately from the 
results for the micro-companies. 
 
Starting with the cost factors, there is no evidence to reject the null hypotheses in respect 
TURNOVER (H3) and COSTFILING (H4). This supports previous research (Collis and Jarvis 
2000, Marriott et al. 2006), which suggests the cost of preparing an additional set of 
abbreviated accounts solely for filing purposes is often minor due to the ease with which they 
can be generated by accounting software. The results for the cost factors suggest that benefits 
are driving the filing of voluntary full accounts. These benefits are divided into management 
and agency factors in the analysis. 
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With regard to the management factors, there is no evidence to reject the null hypotheses in 
respect of ADVICE (H7) and REVIEWFILING (H8) (p > 0.10). Therefore, receiving advice 
from an external accountant or reviewing the costs and benefits of their filing options since 
2003 are not major predictors of voluntary full accounts. The results for DISCLOSETOVER 
(H11) are highly significant for the non-micro small companies (p ≤ 0.01) and the correlation 
coefficient carries the expected negative sign. This supports previous research which 
contends that the directors of small companies do not consider the disclosure of turnover a 
major disadvantage (Carsberg et al. 1985, ICAEW 1995). However, the results are not 
significant for micro-companies (p > 0.10), perhaps because their published accounts have 
fewer users. There is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis in respect of AGE (H12) (p > 
0.10), which is contrary to the findings of Dedman and Lennox (2009), but their study 
focused on medium-sized companies in the manufacturing sector. The results for VOLAUDIT 
(H14) are highly significant (p ≤ 0.01) for both size groups, providing evidence of a link 
between these two voluntary behaviours: companies choosing voluntary audit are likely to 
file voluntary full accounts. 
 
Among the agency factors, the results for USEFULTOUSERS (H20) are significant for non-
micro small companies (p ≤ 0.01). Therefore, the directors of such companies who believe 
their published accounts are useful to users are likely to file voluntary full accounts. There is 
no evidence to reject the null hypotheses for INVESTORSFILING (H21) (p > 0.10). This is 
not surprising since most small businesses are set up to provide a living for their owners 
(Page 1984, Carsberg et al. 1985, Collis 2003, 2008), which makes it unlikely that the 
directors would file full accounts to attract potential investors/acquirers. The results for 
LENDERSFILING (H22) are significant at the 10% level for micro-companies. This 
identifies the bank/lenders as the user group that the directors of micro-companies believe are 
using the voluntary full accounts they place on the public register. There is no evidence to 
reject the null hypotheses for SUPPSCUSTSFILING (H23) for any of the size groups, but 
potential suppliers, trade creditors and major customers have the economic power to obtain 
detailed financial statements and do not rely on the published accounts. The correlation 
coefficient for CREDITAGENCIES (H24) shows an unexpected negative sign, so there is no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis for H24. CONSISTENTFILING was used as a control 
for tradition or habit and is significant for micro-companies (p ≤ 0.10).  
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The Wald statistics in Panel B of Table 8 indicate that the most powerful predictor of 
voluntary full accounts in non-micro small companies is DISCLOSETOVER (H11), followed 
by USEFULTOUSERS (H20) and VOLAUDIT (H14). The pseudo R
2
 indicates that the model 
explains 32% of the variance. The Wald statistics in Panel C of Table 8 indicate that the most 
powerful predictor of voluntary full accounts in micro-companies is VOLAUDIT (H14) 
followed by LENDERSFILING (H22). The pseudo R
2
 indicates that the model explains 24% 
of the variance. The pseudo R
2
 for all the small companies (Panel A of Table 8) is 26%. 
 
[Insert Table 8 hereabouts] 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The motivation for this study is the lack of evidence on the link between the auditing and 
filing choices of small private companies in the UK. The first contribution of the study is that 
it increases our understanding of the drivers of voluntary audit by extending the model of 
Collis et al. (2004). A limitation of previous UK studies on this topic (Collis 2003, Collis et 
al. 2004, Collis 2010) is that they analyse predicted behaviour and focus solely on companies 
filing full accounts. This is addressed in the present study by focusing on the actual decisions 
made in the 2006 accounts (after the UK size thresholds were raised to the EU maximum in 
2004) in a sample of companies filing either full or abbreviated accounts. A second 
contribution of the research is that it demonstrates an important link between the decision to 
opt for voluntary audit and the decision to file voluntary full accounts. The focus on both 
elements better reflects business reality, since the annual financial reporting cycle means the 
auditing and filing decisions coincide. A third contribution is that, to the author’s knowledge, 
this is the first study to investigate the voluntary behaviour of micro-companies in the context 
of the proposed Directive on the annual accounts of micro-entities (EC 2011). 
 
The most powerful determinant of voluntary audit in non-micro small companies is turnover. 
The larger the company’s sales revenue, the more likely it is to have a non-mandatory audit. 
This is followed by perceived demand for audited accounts from investors and perceptions 
that the cost of audit is not a major burden. The most powerful determinant of voluntary audit 
in micro-companies is taking the accountant’s advice, followed by perceptions that the cost of 
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audit is not a major burden; perceived demand from investors; turnover; perceived demand 
from the bank/lenders; and the view that audit provides a check on accounting systems and 
records. Although there is some commonality between the two size groups, the audit decision 
in micro-companies is driven by a wider range of benefits that include both management and 
agency factors. 
 
The most powerful determinant of voluntary full accounts in non-micro small companies is 
the view that disclosing turnover is not a major disadvantage, followed by the belief that the 
accounts they file at Companies House are useful to users and the company has a voluntary 
audit. The most powerful determinant of voluntary full accounts in micro-companies is that 
the company has a voluntary audit, followed by perceptions that the bank/lenders use their 
published accounts. In both size groups, there is evidence that the two voluntary behaviours 
are linked, but perceptions of who may be using their published accounts differ. It is notable 
that credit rating agencies are not seen as a significant user of the published accounts in any 
of the size groups studied. This may be due to an information gap or because personal credit 
ratings are considered to be more important in small businesses. The role of the published 
accounts in credit decisions requires further investigation. 
 
Care must be taken when generalising the results of this study or comparing them with others 
where different selection criteria have been used. This is due to the absence of an up-to-date, 
complete and searchable database for private companies in the UK and problem of low 
response rates in empirical studies. Readers should be aware that the research was based on 
companies in the Fame database (excluding those in the financial intermediation sector), with 
a year end before 31 October 2006 (or had filed early), where the average number of 
employees for 2006 was given. It is not known how Fame gathered the number of employees 
for those filing abbreviated accounts. By discussing some of the anomalies in the UK official 
statistics and the challenges facing small company researchers, this paper make a further 
contribution to the literature that should be useful to those conducting future regulatory 
impact assessments. 
 
This research demonstrates that, after the UK size thresholds were raised to the EU maxima 
in 2004, the benefits of placing full audited accounts on the public record outweighed the 
costs for a significant proportion of both non-micro small companies and micro-companies. 
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The models in this study can be tested in other jurisdiction to provide further evidence to 
ensure that the European Commission’s plans to reduce administrative burdens under the 
proposed Directive (EC 2011) do not have a negative impact on the intended beneficiaries. 
Further research is also needed to assess the potential constraint on economic growth in 
Europe arising from the uneven adoption of the policies, which might lead to companies in 
some Member States being excluded as trading partners (UEAPME 2010). 
 
Regulation should not give the impression that there is no benefit to micro-companies from 
filing full audited accounts. The results of this study demonstrate non-micro small companies 
and micro-companies have assurance and reporting needs in common, although the specific 
drivers differ between the two size groups. The statutory requirement to register annual 
accounts ensures this important source of regulated, general purpose information is available 
to users, particularly those who lack the legal or economic power to demand special purpose 
financial statements. National regulators should take account of the information gap that 
would arise if micro-companies were prevented or discouraged from publishing full, audited 
financial information and the adverse effect this could have on the company’s credit rating 
and, hence, its ability to borrow and obtain trade credit. 
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Table 1. Financial reporting thresholds for small entities 
 
Criteria Proposed micro-entity Small company Small group 
Turnover   £0.62m  (€0.7m)   £6.5m (€8.8m) £6.5m net/£7.8m gross 
Total assets £0.31m  (€0.35m) £3.26m (€4.4m) £3.26m net/£3.9m gross 
Average employees 10 50 50 
 
Source: BIS/FRC (2011: 5), EC (2011: 4), Companies House (2008: n.p.) 
 
Table 2. Fame search criteria and results 
 
Criteria Description Search result 
Active companies Active companies, those  in receivership or dormant 
(excludes companies that  have been dissolved, in 
liquidation or are otherwise inactive) 
2,622,341 
Registered office address Includes addresses in England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (excludes addresses in Ireland) 
2,428,456 
Major sectors All sectors selected apart from  SIC 66 Financial 
intermediation 
1,660,746 
Number of employees Minimum 0, maximum 250 in 2006 29,070 
Total assets (th GBP) Minimum 0, maximum 12,900  in 2006 23,678 
Independent companies Excludes ultimate holding companies, companies with 
an ultimate holding company, holding companies and 
companies with a holding company 
14,684 
Legal form Private 10,269 
Accounts type All 10,238 
 Exclusion of  SIC 65and 67 Financial intermediation 9,998 
 Out of scope (no director’s name, gone away, closed, in 
liquidation, dormant, unable to participate) 
 
(540) 
 Total companies meeting criteria on 31 August 2007 9,458 
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Table 3. Variables in the analysis of demand for voluntary audit 
 
Variable Definition Hypothesis Expected sign 
Cost    
TURNOVER Turnover  in 2006  (1 = up to £1m, 2= £1.1m-£5m, 3 = £5.1m-
£10m, 4 = £10.1m-£15m, 5 = £15.1m-£20m, 6 = £20.1m-£25m, 
7 = £25.1m-£30m, 8 = over £30m)  
H1 + 
COSTAUDIT Extent of agreement that the cost of audit was a major burden 
(5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 = highest 
level of disagreement) 
  H2 - 
Management factors   
ADVICE Whether the company received advice on accounting or 
auditing regulations from an external accountant in 2006 (1, 0) 
H5 + 
REVIEWAUDIT Extent of agreement that the company had reviewed the costs 
and benefits of audit since 2003 (5 =  highest level of 
agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 = highest level of disagreement) 
  H6 + 
CHECK Extent of agreement that audit acts as a check on accounting 
systems and records (5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = 
neutral and 1 = highest level of disagreement)  
  H9 + 
QUALITY Extent of agreement that audit improves the quality of the 
financial information (5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = 
neutral and 1 = highest level of disagreement)  
  H10 + 
CREDITSCORE\ Extent of agreement that audit has a positive effect on the credit 
rating score (5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 
= highest level of disagreement)  
  H13 + 
Agency factors    
FAMILY Whether the company is wholly family owned (1, 0) H15 - 
EXOWNERS Whether the company has external investors without access to  
day-to-day financial information (1, 0) 
H16 + 
INVESTORSAUDIT Extent of agreement that shareholders require audited accounts 
(5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 = highest 
level of disagreement)  
  H17 + 
LENDERSAUDIT Extent of agreement that bank/lenders require audited accounts 
(5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 = highest 
level of disagreement)  
  H18 + 
SUPPSCUSTSAUDIT Extent of agreement that major suppliers or major customers 
require audited accounts (5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = 
neutral and 1 = highest level of disagreement)  
H19 + 
Control variable    
CONSISTENTAUDIT Extent of agreement that consistency with audit decision in 
previous years was a major factor (5 =  highest level of 
agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 = highest level of disagreement) 
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Table 4. Variables in the analysis of demand for voluntary full accounts 
 
Variable Definition Hypothesis Expected sign 
Cost    
TURNOVER Turnover  in 2006  up to £1m (1), £1.1m-£5m (2), £5.1m-
£10m (3), £10.1m-£15m (4), £15.1m-£20m (5), £20.1m-
£25m (6), £25.1m-£30m (7), over £30m (8)  
H3 + 
COSTFILING Extent of agreement that the cheapest option was a major 
factor (5 =  highest level of agreement, 3 = neutral and 1 = 
highest level of disagreement) 
H4 + 
Management factors   
ADVICE Whether an external accountant gave advice on accounting or 
auditing regulations in 2006 (1, 0) 
H7 + 
REVIEWFILING Whether the company had reviewed the costs and benefits of 
the filing options since 2003 (1, 0) 
H8 + 
DISCLOSETOVER Whether disclosing turnover is/would be a major 
disadvantage (1, 0) 
H11 - 
AGE 2006 minus the year of incorporation H12 - 
VOLAUDIT Whether the 2006 accounts were audited on a voluntary basis 
(1) or the company chose exemption (0) 
H14 + 
Agency factors    
USEFULTOUSERS Whether they agree that their accounts filed at Companies 
House are useful to users (1, 0) 
H20 + 
INVESTORSFILING Whether they agree that potential investors or acquirers use 
their accounts filed at Companies House (1, 0) 
H21 + 
LENDERSFILING Whether they agree that the bank/ lenders use their accounts  
filed at Companies House (1, 0) 
H22 + 
SUPPSCUSTSFILING Whether they agree that suppliers, trade creditors or 
customers use their accounts filed at Companies House (1, 0) 
H23 + 
CREDITAGENCIES Whether they agree that credit rating agencies use their 
accounts filed at Companies House (1, 0) 
H24 + 
Control variable    
CONSISTENTFILING Whether they agree that consistency with the filing decision 
in previous years was a major factor ( 1, 0) 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for continuous variable 
 
Variable N Min Max Median Mode Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis 
         Statistic Std error Statistic Std error 
AGE 592 0 114 9 3 14.48 16.256 2.536 0.100 8.177 0.201 
 
 
 
Table 6. Frequency distributions for categorical variables 
 
Variable N Number 
coded 0 
Number 
coded 1 
Number 
coded 2 
Number 
coded 3 
Number 
coded 4 
Number 
coded 5 
Number 
coded 6 
Number 
coded 7 
Number 
coded 8 
TURNOVER 579 - 399 116 39 15 2 4 1 3 
COSTAUDIT 497 - 124 56 134 67 116 - - - 
REVIEWAUDIT 484 - 126 68 159 70 61 - - - 
CHECK 568 - 14 24 126 156 248 - - - 
QUALITY 555 - 60 77 185 135 98 - - - 
CREDITSCORE 535 - 61 51 202 137 84 - - - 
INVESTORSAUDIT 483 - 210 66 94 41 72 - - - 
LENDERSAUDIT 480 - 222 53 99 37 69 - - - 
SUPPSCUSTSAUDIT 474 - 275 72 77 27 23 - - - 
CONSISTENTAUDIT 511 - 109 43 123 108 128 - - - 
VOLAUDIT 592 362 230 - - - - - - - 
ADVICE 592 301 291 - - - - - - - 
FAMILY 590 253 337 - - - - - - - 
EXOWNERS 575 381 194 - - - - - - - 
VOLFULL 537 263 274 - - - - - - - 
COSTFILING 500 318 182 - - - - - - - 
REVIEWFILING 481 309 172 - - - - - - - 
DISCLOSETOVER 494 377 117 - - - - - - - 
USEFULTOUSERS 497 239 258 - - - - - - - 
INVESTORSFILING 592 442 150 - - - - - - - 
LENDERSFILING 592 379 213 - - - - - - - 
SUPPSCUSTSFILING 592 271 321 - - - - - - - 
CREDITAGENCIES 592 302 290 - - - - - - - 
CONSISTENTFILING 518 164 354 - - - - - - - 
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Table 7. Demand for voluntary audit – Logistic regression 
 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Panel A 
All small companies 
 Panel B 
Non-micro small companies 
 Panel C 
Micro-companies* 
  B Wald p  B Wald p  B Wald p 
Cost             
TURNOVER + 2.328 43.909 0.000  3.472 12.732 0.000  1.506 7.087 0.008 
COSTAUDIT - -0.604 21.057 0.000  -1.365 7.085 0.008  -0.460 10.206 0.001 
 
Management factors 
 
   
 
   
 
   
ADVICE + 1.178 12.634 0.000  0.368 0.122 0.727  1.261 10.495 0.001 
CHECK + 0.330 2.364 0.124  0.205 0.091 0.763  0.420 2.839 0.092 
QUALITY + -0.016 0.007 0.934  0.779 1.556 0.212  -0.068 0.096 0.757 
CREDITSCORE + -0.234 1.841 0.175  -0.328 0.412 0.521  -0.319 2.389 0.122 
 
Agency factors 
 
   
 
   
 
   
FAMILY - -0.335 1.004 0.316  -0.622 0.373 0.541  -0.407 1.057 0.304 
EXOWNERS + -0.073 0.042 0.838  -2.534 4.206 0.040  -0.027 0.004 0.951 
INVESTORSAUDIT + 0.700 20.263 0.000  2.117 9.391 0.002  0.530 8.173 0.004 
LENDERSAUDIT + 0.283 2.995 0.084  0.758 2.650 0.104  0.403 3.172 0.075 
SUPPSCUSTSAUDIT + -0.191 1.136 0.286  -0.100 0.053 0.818  -0.497 3.277 0.070 
 
Control 
 
   
 
   
 
   
CONSISTENTAUDIT  0.354 7.312 0.007  -0.335 0.508 0.476  0.490 10.071 0.002 
Constant  -5.952 28.541 0.000  -7.377 4.507 0.034  -5.365 15.375 0.000 
             
N   427    142    285  
Chi-square   331.625    87.509    121.519  
-2 Log likelihood   252.144    38.282    184.533  
Pseudo R2   0.725    0.784    0.527  
 
* A subset of small companies with maximum total assets of £0.31m and up to 10 employees 
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Table 8. Demand for voluntary full accounts – Logistic regression  
 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Panel A 
All small companies 
 Panel B 
Non-micro small companies 
 Panel C 
Micro-companies* 
  B Wald p  B Wald p  B Wald p 
Cost             
TURNOVER + -0.024 0.031 0.861  0.006 0.001 0.977  0.088 0.167 0.682 
COSTFILING + -0.259 1.003 0.317  -0.198 0.070 0.791  -0.259 0.850 0.357 
 
Management factors 
 
   
 
   
 
   
ADVICE + 0.046 0.039 0.843  0.126 0.064 0.800  0.069 0.062 0.804 
REVIEWFILING + 0.199 0.654 0.419  -0.339 0.486 0.486  0.323 1.148 0.284 
DISCLOSETOVER - -0.711 6.764 0.009  -1.438 6.620 0.010  -0.525 2.652 0.103 
AGE - -0.004 0.381 0.537  -0.009 0.738 0.390  0.007 0.410 0.522 
VOLAUDIT + 1.091 13.389 0.000  1.482 4.384 0.036  1.192 10.032 0.002 
 
Agency factors 
 
   
 
   
 
   
USEFULTOUSERS + 0.604 6.177 0.013  1.444 6.241 0.012  0.466 2.648 0.104 
INVESTORSFILING + -0.246 0.675 0.411  -0.620 1.312 0.252  -0.062 0.024 0.877 
LENDERSFILING + 0.411 2.387 0.122  0.047 0.009 0.923  0.561 2.716 0.099 
SUPPSCUSTSFILING + 0.308 1.260 0.262  1.159 2.549 0.110  0.130 0.178 0.673 
CREDITAGENCIES + -0.008 0.001 0.975  -1.407 4.067 0.044  0.272 0.759 0.384 
 
Control 
 
   
 
   
 
   
CONSISTENTFILING  0.606 6.296 0.012  0.683 1.905 0.168  0.573 3.802 0.051 
Constant  -0.955 8.894 0.003  -0.997 1.062 0.303  -1.304 10.370 0.001 
             
N   426    133    293  
Chi-square   90.689    34.154    57.157  
-2 Log likelihood   497.466    133.250    348.259  
Pseudo R2   0.256    0.316    0.237  
 
* A subset of small companies with maximum total assets of £0.31m and up to 10 employees 
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1
 Following restructuring of government departments in mid-2007, the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) replaced the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In 2009 BERR was renamed 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). 
2
 The Fourth Company Law Directive refers to ‘abridged’ accounts. The UK Companies Act 1981 used the term 
‘modified’ accounts, which was changed to ‘abbreviated’ accounts in the Companies Act 1989 and remains as 
the term used in the Companies Act 2006. 
3
 This category includes public corporations and nationalised bodies. 
4
 It also specifies thresholds for eligible medium-sized entities to qualify for the abbreviated accounts that apply 
to them. These are not shown since the paper focuses on small and micro-entities. The thresholds are subject to 
periodic revision to take account of monetary and economic trends. 
5
 After a compromise reached in the Council of Ministers in November 2011, the Legal Affairs Committee 
approved the thresholds for a micro-entity in the second reading the Report on the proposed Directive on the 
annual accounts of micro-entities.  At the time of writing (January 2012), the Report still needs to be approved 
in a plenary session of the European Parliament. 
6
 The provisions of the Companies Act 1981 were consolidated in the Companies Act 1985, which was amended 
by the Companies Act 1989 and superseded by the Companies Act 2006. 
7
 Abbreviated accounts for medium-sized entities require a higher level of disclosure. 
8
 Abbreviated accounts were introduced by the Companies Act 1981, which used the term ‘modified accounts’. 
Audit exemption was introduced by a statutory instrument in 1994, which amended the Companies Act 1985. 
9
 There were only 19 Member States at that time. 
10
 Under the Companies Act 2006, ‘an entity is excluded from the small companies regime if it is a public 
company, a company that is an authorised insurance company, a banking company, an e-money issuer, an ISD 
investment firm or a UCITS management company, or carries on insurance market activity, or is a member of 
an ineligible group’ (c. 46, Part 15, Chapter 1, p. 178). 
11
 These are the EU maxima from April 2008, which were adopted by the UK from the same date. 
12
 The detailed rules are in the Companies Act 2006, c. 45, Parts 15 and 16. 
13
 For example, content analysis based on disclosure check lists developed for multinational companies. 
14
 By the time the consultation had been completed, the EU maxima for turnover had been raised to £5.6 million 
and the balance sheet total to £2.8 million. These thresholds were adopted by the UK in 2004. 
15
 The questionnaire for this study has now been used as the basis for government surveys in several other 
jurisdictions including Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
16
 Subsequently renamed the Professional Oversight Board  (POB). 
17
 In the USA, where financial reporting by private companies is unregulated, research shows that ‘firms with 
audited financial statements benefit in the form of greater access to credit’ (Allee and Yohn 2009, p. 1). 
18
 Previous studies of small and/or medium-sized private companies using Fame include Collis (2003), Chaney 
et al. (2004), Collis et al. (2004), Clatworthy and Peel (2007), Clatworthy et al. (2009), Dedman and Lennox 
(2009) and Lennox and Pittman (2011). 
19
 These represent two of the three proposed size thresholds for a medium company at the time of the survey (the 
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third threshold relates to turnover). 
20
 Section J companies were excluded because they do not qualify as ‘small’ or ‘medium’ under the Companies 
Act 2006. 
21
 There may also be unknown delays in Fame adding new filings to the database. 
22
 See Curran and Blackburn (2001, Chapter 3).  
23
 Fame defines an active company as one that is active, in receivership or dormant. It defines an inactive 
company as one that has been dissolved, is in liquidation or is otherwise inactive. 
24
 Since April 2008, this has been reduced to 9 months under the Companies Act 2006 (DTI, 2007). 
25
 In 2007, private companies could register their accounts up to 10 months after the end of their accounting 
reference period. 
26
 For example, some 448,700 private companies were incorporated in 2006-7 and 5,880 were converted from 
public companies. In the same period, 224,800 were dissolved and a further 203,400 were in liquidation or in 
course of removal from the register (Companies House 2007, Table A2). 
27
 This would be difficult since small companies filing abbreviated accounts do not disclose turnover and those 
using the small companies’ regime are not required to give information about employee numbers (Companies 
Act 2006, c. 46, part 15, Chapter 4, p. 191). 
28
 All turnover data exclude SIC2003 Section J (financial intermediation) where turnover is not available on a 
comparable basis. 
29
 The Bolton Committee’s survey asked for the completion of two questionnaires.  The other questionnaire was 
concerned with general characteristics of the firm and achieved a 22% response rate. 
30
 This is corroborated by the Companies House data on Fame, which shows that 63% of these companies had 
filed ‘total exempt accounts’. 
31
 For the purpose of this study, a micro-company is defined as a small company with a maximum balance sheet 
total of £0.31 million and an average of up to 10 employees during the year, representing  two of the three size 
tests proposed for a micro-entity (see Table 1). 
32
 Defined as a company where all shareholders had access to day-to-day internal financial information. 
33
 The test is based on the log likelihood of the fitted model. 
34
 The Spearman correlation matrix of the variables used to explain voluntary audit shows medium positive 
correlation between QUALITY and CHECK (.539), QUALITY and CREDITSCORE (.439), LENDERSAUDIT 
and TURNOVER (.444), INVESTORSAUDIT and LENDERSAUDIT (.661), and between INVESTORSAUDIT 
and SUPPSCUSTSAUDIT (.499). Correlation was low for other pairings. Since all coefficients are less than .7 
(70%), it is unlikely that there is any major overlap in their predictive power (Kervin 1992, p. 608). 
35
 The Spearman correlation matrix of the variables used to explain voluntary full accounts shows medium 
negative correlation between COSTFILING and VOLAUDIT (-.456) and low correlation for other pairings. 
Since all coefficients are less than .7 (70%), it is unlikely that there is any major overlap in their predictive 
power (Kervin 1992, p. 608). 
